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Abstract : I argue that recent attempts to show that meaning and
content are not normative fail. The two most important arguments anti-
normativists have presented are what I call the argument from constitu-
tion and the argument from guidance. Both of these arguments suﬀer
from the same basic problem: they overlook the possibility of focusing on
assessability by norms, rather than compliance with norms or guidance
by norms. Moreover, I argue that the anti-normativists arguments fail
even if we ignore this basic problem. Thus, we have not been given good
reasons to think that normativism is false.
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1 Introduction
Normativists regarding content hold that content is a normative matter, and
analogously for normativists about meaning (Gibbard, 2012; Whiting, 2007,
2009; Millar, 2004; Brandom, 1994; Glock, 1992; McDowell, 1984; Kripke, 1982;
Anscombe, 1981). Anti-normativists disagree (Glüer andWikforss, 2013, 2009a,b;
Glüer, 2002, 1999; Glüer and Pagin, 1998; Hattiangadi, 2009, 2007, 2006; Bykvist
and Hattiangadi, 2007). I will focus mostly on normativism about content, but
a lot of what I say will also apply to normativism about meaning. My goal is
to defend normativism against recent attacks.
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What is normativism? I think of normativism as a thesis in the founda-
tional theory of content. Robert Stalnaker (1997) distinguishes descriptive se-
mantics, which tells us what semantic values expressions of a language have,
from foundational semantics, which tells us what determines the correct de-
scriptive semantics for an actually used language. Such a distinction can be
applied in the theory of content more generally. Normativists hold that norma-
tive facts necessarily covary with the correct descriptive theory of content for
a given language or the mental states of a subject.1 Content-determining nor-
mativism (CD-normativism) holds that normative facts partially determine the
correct descriptive theory; content-engendered normativism (CE-normativism)
holds that the norms are merely a consequence of the correct descriptive theory.
I will mostly focus on CD-normativism.
The debate doesn't concern what we may call compositional semantics,2
i.e. a theory that articulates our tacit semantic competence. Normativism, as
I understand it, is a claim about what anchors the technical concepts we use
in our (compositional) theory of content, in something that we can understand
independently of these technical concepts, where such an anchoring or expla-
nation need not be reductive. The technical concepts we might want to use
include truth at a point, reference, assertability, provability, incompat-
ibility, inferential role, etc. Normativists claim that some concepts we need
for stating the correct theory of content must be explained in terms of norms
 typically norms governing linguistic or mental acts or states.3
Thus, normativism, in the CD version, is the view that we must explain the
central concepts of our theory of content in terms of norms, and that norma-
tive facts are among the facts that determine the correct descriptive theory of
1Here I am ignoring the issue of non-factualism about normativity. Nothing in what follows
hangs on this.
2Here I am drawing on work by John McFarlane (2014) and Seth Yalcin (2011; 2014).
3This is, e.g., what I take MacFarlane (2005) to be doing when he tries to make sense of
the notion of relative truth by connecting it to the aim or norms of assertion.
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content for a given language or the mental acts of a subject. Since this is how
I see the issue, I will not discuss anti-normativist considerations of the follow-
ing shape: Normativists think that meaning is normative because meaningful
expressions, beliefs, etc. have correctness conditions. However, `correctness' is
not a normative term here; it can be explained in terms of truth, reference, sat-
isfaction, etc. So normativism fails. Such considerations simply assume what
is at issue, namely that the central concepts of the correct semantic theory are
non-normative.
I shall not argue for normativism; I merely defend it against some challenges.
I will assume that there is a plausible initial motivation for normativism. What
could the motivation be? There are diﬀerent such motivations for diﬀerent peo-
ple. Some think, e.g., that facts about meaning can (non-instrumentally) justify
the use of expressions and concepts. Speaking for myself, I am a normativist
because I think that the concept of a good inference must play a crucial role in
our theory of content. By good inference I do not mean a model-theoretic or
proof-theoretic notion or anything the like. At best, such notions are attempts
to codify an antecedent notion of inferential goodness or validity (see Field,
forthcoming). The concept of inferential goodness must be explained, I think,
in normative terms; we must say something about what inferences we should
and should not make.
The paper is structured as follows: I ﬁrst give a rough sketch of the two
central arguments against normativism and explain why they suﬀer from the
same basic problem (Section 2). I then look at the debate in more detail. I
present the dialectic as starting with a challenge for the normativist, and I say
how the normativist should react (Section 3). The anti-normativist then oﬀers
her two central arguments to back up her challenge; I show that these arguments
are unsuccessful (Sections 4 and 5).
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2 The Basic Problem with the Anti-Normativists'
Arguments
Diﬀerent anti-normativists hold anti-normativism for diﬀerent reasons. Some
are motivated by the idea that anti-normativism is the only way to rescue us
from semantic skepticism (Hattiangadi, 2007). Others seem motivated by the
Davidsonian idea that the content of an utterance or mental state is the content
that would be assigned to the utterance or state by an overall interpretation
that makes the subject come out maximally (or suﬃciently) rational (Glüer,
1999, 2000; Glüer and Wikforss, 2009a).4 Despite these very diﬀerent projects,
anti-normativists are united in attacking normativism. Thus, anti-normativism
is best evaluated by looking at the arguments anti-normativists have presented.
In this section, I sketch two central anti-normativist arguments and explain
what I see as the fundamental problem with them. I do this very quickly; I go
into more detail later on.
As far as I can see, the two most important arguments anti-normativists have
presented are what I call the argument from constitution and the argument
from guidance.5 The argument from constitution goes like this (Glüer and
Wikforss, 2009a, pp. 48-52): According to normativism, following particular
norms is constitutive of having contentful mental states. Hence, we cannot
violate these norms without ceasing to have contentful mental states, unless we
are in mitigating circumstances. But norms that we cannot violate unless we
are in mitigating circumstances are not genuinely normative. So normativism
fails. A variant of the argument says that if a given expression or state having
a certain content is constituted by the subject following a certain norm, the
4Let me brieﬂy register where I disagree. Regarding the ﬁrst motivation, I cannot see why
normativism should make semantic skepticism unavoidable unless one adopts an error theory
about normative judgments. Regarding the second motivation, I doubt that the criterion of
(maximal) rationality can single out a unique descriptive theory of content.
5For what it is worth, those are the arguments that strike me as the strongest ones.
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subject cannot violate the norm unless she is in mitigating circumstances. So
these norms are not genuine norms.
The argument from guidance goes like this (Glüer and Wikforss, 2009a, pp.
55-63): Normativists hold that every contentful state or act is the result of, or
an instance of, the subject following a norm; the norm must guide the subject.
But in order to follow a norm, the subject must have been in a diﬀerent, and
temporally prior, contentful state. Thus, a vicious regress ensues. A variant
of this argument says that in order to create norms that could constitute facts
about contentful acts and states, one needs some prior contentful acts or states.
Both of these arguments suﬀer from the same basic problem: anti-normativists
overlook the possibility that norms can be constitutive of something without
those who are subject to the norm being guided by the norm or being in ac-
cordance with the norm. One can think that divine commandments, e.g., are
constitutive of morality while thinking that no one is guided by these command-
ments and everyone is violating them. Similarly, the claim that certain laws are
constitutive of a legal system does not imply that anyone is guided by these
laws or that anyone abides by them. Normativity is not always a matter of the
ﬁrst-person deliberative standpoint.
A plausible normativism holds, I think, that what partially constitutes facts
regarding what someone means or what content a mental state has is that the
subject is correctly assessable by certain norms. If an utterance or a mental
state has a certain content, we can legitimately evaluate what the subject does
in light of certain norms.6 And it couldn't have this content if the norms didn't
apply. Neither the argument from constitution nor the argument from guidance
gets any traction with such a view.
Regarding the argument from constitution, the normativist can say that
6I think the relevant norms here are norms of reasoning and norms of rational discourse.
More on this below.
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someone who violates a norm outside of mitigating circumstances can neverthe-
less be assessable by the norm. And regarding the argument from guidance, the
normativist can deny that every contentful act or state must be the result of,
or an instance of, following a norm.
Anti-normativists might reply that the normativism I have in mind requires
a conception of normativity that is very diﬀerent from their conception. I am
working with a third-personal, evaluative conception of normativity. They are
interested only in norms that tell someone what to do  from a ﬁrst-personal,
deliberative standpoint (Glüer and Wikforss, 2013, p. 82). However, it is implau-
sible to restrict the normative to a ﬁrst-person standpoint. Judgments about
what someone else should do are just as normative and prescriptive as judg-
ments about what I myself should do. The nature of the normativity involved
does not change just because the standpoint of assessment changes. Perhaps
one sometimes has to follow a norm, or comply with the norm in suﬃciently
many cases, in order to fall under the norm. But norms like divine command-
ments and laws show that this need not always be so. If anti-normativists are
not interested in normative assessments from the third-person standpoint, they
cannot claim to have shown that content is not normative. If that is not their
goal, that's great! But if it is, more work lies ahead of them.7
My sketch of the anti-normativists' arguments was very rough, and my reply
was quick. So let us go through the dialectic more carefully. This will also give
me a chance to highlight problems with the anti-normativists' arguments that
are independent of the basic problem just outlined.
7Sometimes anti-normativists claim that some of their arguments apply not only to pre-
scriptions but also to pure evaluations, or norms concerning `Sein-Sollen', not `Tun-Sollen '
(Glüer and Wikforss, 2009a, p. 32n4). Notice, ﬁrst, that the distinction between ought-to-
dos and ought-to-bes is not the distinction I am using. If I say You ought to φ, this
is an ought-to-do but it is a third-personal assessment. This claim about what you ought
to do can be true, whether or not you are guided by it. Second, the particular argument
anti-normativists have in mind here is their response to what they call the simple argument.
Since I am not replying to the simple argument, I need not consider their response here.
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3 The Anti-Normativist's Challenge
We can think of the debate between normativists and anti-normativists as be-
ginning with a challenge: the anti-normativist challenges the normativist to
formulate the norms that are (allegedly) essential to content. In a second step,
the anti-normativist argues that none of the normativist's proposals work. In
this section, I want to focus on the ﬁrst step. We can formulate the anti-
normativist's challenge as an argument.
ArgumentA:
(A.P1) If content (meaning) is normative, a sentence of the form S 's mental
state M has content C  (S means F by t), perhaps together with
some non-normative statements, implies something of the form S
ought/may (not) φ.
(A.P2) S 's mental state M has content C  (S means F by t) implies
nothing of the form S ought/may (not) φ, not even together with
some non-normative statements.
(A.C) ∴ Content (meaning) is not normative.
It is crucial to be clear about what kind of norm anti-normativists think is
required to falsify (A.P2): First, the force of the norm must not depend on
any antecedent desire (Glüer and Wikforss, 2009b; Hattiangadi, 2006, p. 228).
Second, the norm must spell out a genuinely semantic obligation (Glüer and
Wikforss, 2009a, pp. 35, 38; Hattiangadi, 2006, p. 237). Third, the norm must
guide the linguistic behavior or reasoning of the agent (Glüer and Pagin, 1998;
Glüer and Wikforss, 2009a, p. 32). Call these conditions the three ought-
conditions.
With these conditions in place, anti-normativists argue against particular
principles that connect meaning-claims to ought-claims; e.g.:
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(N1) S means F by t → (x ) [S ought (to apply t to x ↔ x is F )].
(N2) For all S and p: S ought to believe that p ↔ p is true.
Anti-normativists are right to reject these particular principles. This does not
show, of course, that (A.P2) is true. Thus, the argument is a challenge to
formulate norms that falsify (A.P2).
Evaluating Argument A
The debate about normativism has focused mostly on (A.P2). Before I turn to
this debate, however, I want to note that the normativist might reject (A.P1).
One reason why anti-normativists think that they can presuppose (A.P1) is
that many normativists accept it. Kripke, e.g., famously claimed that meaning
something by a sign must be such that, when suitably queried, whatever in fact
I (am disposed to) do, there is a unique thing that I should do (Kripke, 1982,
p. 24). However, the normativist need not follow Kripke here. An analogy can
help to bring this out.
We can, to a ﬁrst approximation, think of the claim that meaning is nor-
mative in analogy to the claim that money is normative. The latter claim
is naturally interpreted as saying: We cannot explain what money is without
appealing to norms, and normative facts are among the facts that determine
the correct descriptive theory of who has what amount of money. The money-
normativist might think, e.g., that we must appeal to norms governing property,
which are typically genuinely prescriptive (and not, e.g., of the form x counts
as y in C ), in order to explain what money is. And she may think that the facts
that determine who has what amount of money include facts regarding who has
a right to what. Must the money-normativist claim that statements like S has
a twenty-dollar bill in her pocket imply statements of the form S ought/may
(not) φ? It does not seem so. According to money-normativism, what makes
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something money is, inter alia, the role it occupies in a network of norms. It
does not follow that individual statements about particular amounts of money
always have normative implications. Similarly, the normativist about content
can say that what makes something a contentful act or state is, inter alia, the
role it occupies in a network of norms. It does not follow that statements of
the form S means F by t or S 's mental state M has content C  always have
normative implications.
One important diﬀerence between the cases is that there can be contentful
thought and talk before money is around, while this is not so for content. I don't
think this is a problem for the normativist. It will be more fruitful, however,
to look at this issue in the context of (A.P2). So let's grant (A.P1) and answer
the challenge directly by rejecting (A.P2).
My aim here is not to provide a normativist foundational theory of con-
tent. Rather, I want to give an example of what I take to be normative facts
that falsify (A.P2), namely normative facts about reasoning. Claims about the
contents of, e.g., beliefs imply proscriptions, namely proscriptions to reason in
certain ways:
(N3) For every believable content C, there are ways W such that, if sub-
ject S 's belief B has content C, then S must not reason in ways W
with B (with possible exceptions in special circumstances).
I don't think that (N3) is the only principle that falsiﬁes (A.P2), but it will serve
well as an illustration.8 The truth of (N3) follows from two plausible premises:
First, for every possible belief, there is a way to reason fallaciously with the
belief, and which pieces of reasoning are fallacious depends on the content of the
belief. Second, you must not reason fallaciously. The principle allows that there
8The application of (N3) to Kripke's famous case of quaddition is straightforward: If Kripke
means addition, and not quaddition, by +, he may not reason in such a way that his result
for the query What is 57+68? is 5.
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are special circumstances in which you may reason fallaciously, but normally
you must not. If you reason fallaciously, you are open to legitimate criticism.
You cannot block this criticism by pointing out that you don't have certain
desires. Reasoning fallaciously is irrational, and calling someone irrational
is a genuinely normative evaluation. Thus, (N3) is true and spells out genuine
normative consequences of content ascriptions. Moreover, (N3) does not depend
on any particular theory of content.
Anti-normativists have considered and rejected norms like (N3). As far as
I can see, they have ﬁve objections that we can apply, with slight adjustments,
to (N3). The two most important objections are versions of the argument from
constitution and the argument from guidance:
(i) Proscriptions like the one in (N3) are constitutive of the beliefs in-
volved and, hence, cannot be violated outside of mitigating circum-
stances (Glüer and Wikforss, 2009a, p. 51).
(ii) Norms governing reasoning cannot be rules in anything like the
sense we are interested in: prescriptions capable of guiding an ac-
tivity or performance (Glüer and Wikforss, 2009a, p. 48).
I will discuss these points in the next two sections. In addition to these major
objections, anti-normativists have three smaller points:
(iii) The proscription in (N3) is not genuinely semantic (Glüer and Wik-
forss, 2009a, p. 38); it derives from the norm of rationality that you
must not reason fallaciously.
(iv) Saying that something is irrational is not a genuinely normative
evaluation. If a subject reasons fallaciously, the subject is being
irrational, but it is a further question whether holding an irrational
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belief is wrong in the sense of violating a norm (Glüer and Wikforss,
2013, p. 91).
(v) Norms of reasoning, and the like, cannot determine the full set of
truth or satisfaction conditions for an expression or mental state
(Hattiangadi, 2007, p. 206). Norms that are strong enough to do
that lead to obligations no one can fulﬁll.
In this section, I want to discuss only points (iii)-(v). With respect to point
(iii) it is important to keep in mind what the CD-normativist is trying to do:
she wants to connect normative facts about, e.g., reasoning, assertion, belief,
etc. to facts about what the correct descriptive theory of content for a given
subject or community is. It cannot be an objection to this idea that facts about
content make contact with normative facts only via pragmatics or the theory
of rationality. That is simply part of normativism. The CD-normativist thinks
that in order to make sense of our theory of content and to determine whether
it is adequate, we must look at the connection between the theory of content
and the theory of rationality or pragmatics.9
The anti-normativist might respond that my reply to point (iii) depends on
me favoring CD-normativism, which says that norms partially determine the
contents of utterances and thoughts, over CE-normativism, which says that the
content is determined independently and merely gives rise to the norms in ques-
tion (Glüer and Wikforss, 2009a,c). They may think that, on CE-normativism,
(N3) is like the norm: If you are so heavy that sitting on someone else would kill
that person, you must not sit on anyone. Satisfying the antecedent is a straight-
forwardly non-normative matter. The normative force of the statement derives
from the norm that you must not kill anyone. Similarly, the anti-normativist
may think that the fact that S 's belief B has content C is a non-normative
9Glï¾÷er and Wikforss seem to implicitly acknowledge this when they raise objections like
point (iii) only against CE-normativism and not against CD-normativism.
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matter. The normative force of (N3) depends on the norm that you must not
reason fallaciously (Glüer and Wikforss, 2015; Hattiangadi, 2006). However,
that's not plausible. Compare the norm If doing φ would be coward, then you
must not do φ. Is it plausible that something being coward is a non-normative
fact and that the norm derives its force from the norm that you must not do
what is vicious? No. What makes the action bad is ﬁrst and foremost that it is
coward, and we can connect its cowardice to other vices by saying that the act
is vicious. Similarly, for a CE-normativist, a piece of fallacious reasoning is bad
ﬁrst and foremost because it involved such-and-such contents in such-and-such
a way. To call it a fallacy does not specify the deeper ground of the badness; it
merely connects this particular piece of reasoning with other pieces of reasoning
that are also bad. By contrast, in the case of sitting on someone, what makes
the action bad is ﬁrst and foremost that it is an act of killing someone. So
(N3) is like the norm concerning cowardice and not like the norm concerning
obesity. Thus, objection (iii) fails not only against CD-normativism but also
against CE-normativism.
This brings us to point (iv), i.e., the claim that assessments in terms of
rationality are not genuinely normative. Anti-normativists try to defend this
surprising thesis by providing a non-normative conception of rationality.
Strictly speaking, on our account reasons are (true or false) propositions.
Having such a reason is simply to believe the relevant proposition. [...]
The reasons themselves, the propositions that are the contents of the rele-
vant beliefs, stand in inferential or evidential relations. And beliefs stand
in reasons relations because their contents stand in these relations; rea-
sons relations between beliefs `piggy-back' on the inferential or evidential
relations their contents stand in. [...] With reasons relations thus in place,
we can then say that it is rational for a subject S to believe that p iﬀ p is
evidentially supported (to a suﬃcient degree) by the reasons the subject
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has. Rationality in general thus becomes a matter of the degree to which
a subject's beliefs in fact instantiate the pattern of evidential relations
between their contents. (Glüer and Wikforss, 2013, pp. 90-91)
This conception of rationality presupposes that we don't have to bring in norms
of reasoning in order to explain the contents of beliefs or the inferential and
evidential relations between these contents. Clearly, the CD-normativist will
deny this. So the argument is question-begging against CD-normativism. But
the problem with this argument against the normativity of rationality runs
deeper. To see this, notice that a parallel argument could be used to show that
morality is not normative: The belief that p and the intention to φ stand in the
being-a-moral-reason-to relation because their contents stand in an appropriate
relation of moral support. It is moral for a subject to intend to do φ iﬀ the
content of the intention to φ is morally supported (to a suﬃcient degree) by
the reasons the subject has. Being moral is a matter of the degree to which a
subject's beliefs and intentions instantiate the pattern of moral support relations
between their contents. Clearly, these considerations don't show that morality
is not normative. The pattern would not be a pattern of moral support if it were
permissible to reason practically about a relevant topic without instantiating it.
That's where the normative force of morality shows up. Similarly, the relations
of inferential and evidential support would not be such relations if it were okay
not to instantiate (any of) them when reasoning theoretically. You shouldn't
reason fallaciously. Whatever the anti-normativist says about relations between
contents, she is not characterizing rationality adequately if she leaves it open
whether you should be rational. In fact, rationality seems to be normative in
many respects: we should be rational and avoid being irrational, being rational
is a human good, we should promote the rationality of ourselves and others, and
saying that someone is irrational is a criticism. So objection (iv) fails.
13
What about point (v), i.e., the claim that norms of reasoning cannot settled
truth/satisfaction conditions? CE-normativists obviously need not deny this.
And the same goes for CD-normativism. CD-normativism claims that normative
facts are among the facts that determine the correct descriptive theory of content
for a given language or mental economy. It is not the claim that normative facts
are suﬃcient to determine the correct descriptive theory.
With these three minor points out of the way, we can return to the two
central arguments against normativism.
4 The Argument from Constitution
In response to (A.P2), I have suggested that facts about the contents of one's
beliefs imply proscriptions to reason with these beliefs in certain ways. Anti-
normativists have rejected proposals like this. The idea behind their argument
is that norms of rationality cannot be genuinely normative because they are
constitutive of having contentful mental states (Glüer and Wikforss, 2009a, pp.
46-52). According to Kathrin Glï¾÷er and Asa Wikforss, this follows from two
claims: First, if your acts and states are not in accordance with the norms
of rationality and you are not in mitigating circumstances, you are not a
believer and, hence, the norms of rationality do not apply to you. So you cannot
violate the norms of rationality if you are not in mitigating circumstances.
Second, oughts not only imply cans, they also imply the possibility of violation,
and, in particular, it must be possible to violate a norm outside of mitigating
circumstances (Glüer and Wikforss, 2009a, p. 49).
ArgumentB:
(B.P1) If S 's acts and states being in accordance with norms N is consti-
tutive of S having contentful mental states, then it is impossible for
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S 's acts and states to violate N, unless S is in mitigating circum-
stances.
(B.P2) S 's acts and states being in accordance with the norms of rationality
(when not in mitigating circumstances) is constitutive of S having
contentful mental states.
(B.P3) If norms N are genuinely normative for S 's acts or states, S 's acts
and states can violate N without S being in mitigating circum-
stances.
(B.C) ∴ The norms of rationality are not genuinely normative.
Anti-normativists also think that there is a further problem with the idea that
the norms of rationality are constitutive of contentful states. If the `rules' of
rationality are constitutive of thought in general, no-one can decide to follow, or
be motivated by, these `rules ' (Glüer and Wikforss, 2009a, p. 47). This point
has to do with the fact that anti-normativists don't count a norm as genuinely
normative unless it guides performances. I will discuss this issue in the next
section.
Evaluating Argument B
How should the normativist react to ArgumentB? Regarding the second premise,
the normativist should not hold that the relevant norms are constitutive in the
sense of (B.P2). The normativist should hold that what (partially) constitutes
that S has contentful mental states is not that S 's acts and states are in accor-
dance with the norms of rationality, but that S 's acts and states are subject to,
fall under, are assessable by these norms.
If we work with this claim about constitution, the analog for the ﬁrst premise,
(B.P1), does not hold. To see this, suppose we stipulate that something is a K
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just in case it falls under norm N. Falling under norm N is, thus, constitutive
of being a K. Does it follow that every K that is not in accordance with N is
in mitigating circumstances? Clearly not. Moreover, it is implausible to think
that S has contentful mental states only if S 's act and states are in accordance
with the norms of rationality unless she is in mitigating circumstances. After
all, if being out of line with the norms of rationality just once while outside of
mitigating circumstances implies that you don't have contentful mental states,
it is next to impossible to tell whether anyone has contentful mental states.
What matters is assessability by the norms and not compliance with them.
As already intimated in Section 2, this is the basic problem with anti-normativist
arguments. Let's put it to one side. Let's grant, for the sake of argument, that
constitution by normative facts is a matter of being in accordance with norms.
Is the argument from constitution convincing if we ignore its basic problem?
Perhaps what Glï¾÷er and Wikforss really mean is that if following a rule
R in most cases is constitutive of being, say, a K, there must be circumstances
under which a K cannot fail to act in accordance with R. But that can't be
right. Call somebody a K  iﬀ she follows rule R in more than 95% of the
cases. Is there any particular action and any particular circumstances such that
it is impossible for a K not to perform the action under these circumstances,
without ceasing to be a K ? Obviously not! In any particular case, a K can do
anything, as long as she follows the rule in enough other cases.
Perhaps Glï¾÷er and Wikforss don't think that such a principle is true in
general but that there are such special circumstances for the particular case of
rules of rationality, like (N3). They say:
[T]here might be further conditions such that a subject fulﬁlling them,
and believing that p and that if p then q , cannot fail to believe that q .
That there in fact are such conditions is very plausible even if deﬁnitive
lists might prove elusive. After all, the question whether to believe q is
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simply settled once I am completely awake, fully aware of all the relevant
beliefs at the same time, and give it all my attention  provided, at
least, that the relevant beliefs are not too numerous or too complicated.
No prescription is required to establish the connection, and no prescription
can be violated. (Glüer and Wikforss, 2009a, p. 50)
Is it really plausible that there are such conditions? I don't think so. As the
psychological literature on reasoning shows (e.g. work on the Wason Selection
Task), people fail to draw easy, immediate inferences even if they are completely
awake, fully aware of all relevant beliefs, and give the task all their attention (for
an introduction see Johnson-Laird, 2006). Of course, there might be circum-
stances that make it nomologically necessary for the subject to reason correctly.
If that is the right reading of mitigating circumstances in (B.P1), however, we
must also read (B.P3) in this way. But it is certainly false that if norms N are
genuinely normative for S 's acts or states, then S 's acts and states can violate
N when it is nomologically necessary for S 's acts and states to be in accordance
with N. There simply seems to be no reading of (B.P1)-(B.P3) under which
ArgumentB is sound.
What about (B.P3) by itself? Glï¾÷er and Wikforss claim that if the rules
of rationality are genuinely prescriptive, then it must be possible to violate these
rules outside of mitigating circumstances.
If a putative prescription can only be violated under `mitigating circum-
stances' like [`cognitive overload' and the like], the forbidden combinations
thus realized would therefore not be of the right kind, the kind required
by prescriptivity. [...] for instance the prescription that forbids resting
your elbows on the table while dining in company. Would we think such
a prescription was in force for us if we could `violate' it only when half
asleep or not paying any attention to what we are doing? Quite clearly
not. And the same holds for any putative prescription to the eﬀect that
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subjects believing that p and that if p then q ought to believe that q .
Assume that there is such a prescription. The principle that ought im-
plies the possibility of violation requires that it could be violated even
by a calm, fully awake subject with rather simple states of mind. But it
cannot. (Glüer and Wikforss, 2009a, p. 50)
I see no reason to accept the idea that it must be possible to violate norms out-
side of mitigating circumstances. Suppose I can only murder someone in the
heat of the moment if I am in mitigating circumstances for murdering someone
in the heat of the moment. Does this show that the rule Don't murder anyone
in the heat of the moment cannot be in force for me? If by mitigating circum-
stances we mean circumstances such that I cannot be sanctioned or punished
for my act of murder in any way, the rule seems pointless. When we look at
rules of rationality, however, this is not the situation we are in. It is simply
not true that you can violate the rules of rationality only if your circumstances
are such that you cannot legitimately be criticized for being irrational. That
would indeed make such rules pointless. In fact, however, people often reason
fallaciously and are, thereby, subject to legitimate criticism. Hence, we must
reject (B.P3).
We have seen that the argument from constitution fails even if we ignore
the basic problem that it focuses on compliance instead of assessability. I have
ignored the issue of guidance. So let's turn to what is perhaps the ultimate
stronghold of anti-normativism: the problem of guidance.
5 The Argument from Guidance
Anti-normativists think that normativists are committed, if their thesis is at all
interesting, to the claim that the relevant norms guide subjects in their thought
or talk. Diﬀerent anti-normativists think this for diﬀerent reasons. For Anandi
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Hattiangadi (2007) the normativist must think this because Hattiangadi's nor-
mativist defends semantic skepticism. Since I have no interest in defending
semantic skepticism, I shall ignore this idea. Glï¾÷er and Wikforss think that
the requirement of guidance derives directly from the requirement that the rel-
evant norms be prescriptive.
Along with almost everyone else in this discussion, we take the relevant
normativity to be prescriptive in nature. Prescriptions, we take it, involve
genuine `oughts'; their very point is to guide our performances. (Glüer
and Wikforss, 2009a, p. 32)
And in a paper on the normativity of belief they say:
[T]he normativist could abandon guidance  and thereby genuine pre-
scriptivity  in favor of some other, novel construal of normativity. Since
we are only concerned with genuine prescriptivity, that would amount to
accepting the conclusion of this paper. (Glüer and Wikforss, 2013, p. 82)
The idea seems to be that merely being in accordance with a norm is not a
genuinely normative matter. In order to be genuinely normative, something
must be a matter of rule-following and not merely of being in accordance with a
rule (Glüer and Wikforss, 2009a, p. 55). But to follow a rule, the rule must guide
the subject (Glüer and Pagin, 1998).
Intuitively, what is required for following a rule R is that the performances
in question can be explained by reference to R. This explanation is avail-
able because S herself takes a certain attitude to R. [. . . ] On a very
natural reading, this simply means that R plays a role in the motivation
S has for what she does. [. . . I]n order to be motivated by R, S needs
to have a pro-attitude towards what is in accordance with R. (Glüer and
Wikforss, 2009a, p. 55)
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This leads to what Glï¾÷er and Wikforss call the dilemma of regress and idle-
ness (Glüer andWikforss, 2009a, p. 54). If the norms that the normativist cares
about ﬁgure in an explanation of all contentful acts and states, this launches us
on a vicious regress. After all, the pro-attitude towards what is in accordance
with R is a contentful state. So a kind of normativism on which the content of
all intentional states is determined by norms cannot, on pain of vicious regress,
construe any kind of intentional mental state as a condition on rule-following
(Glüer and Wikforss, 2009a, p. 57). But, anti-normativists continue, some-
thing that does not require an intentional mental state cannot be a case of
rule-following. And if contentful acts and states are not cases of, or the results
of, rule-following, calling the standards in question normative is idle.
ArgumentC:
(C.P1) The norms to which the normativist appeals must either guide all
of the subjects contentful acts and states or they are not genuinely
normative.
(C.P2) If the relevant norms guide a contentful act or state of the subject,
the subject must have enjoyed a prior contentful act or state that
explains the act or state that is under the guidance of the norm.
(C.P3) It is impossible that every contentful act or state requires inﬁnitely
many prior contentful acts or states.
(C.C) ∴ The norms to which the normativist appeals are not genuinely
normative.
Evaluating Argument C
Here again we encounter the basic problem from Section 2: anti-normativists
focus on guidance and not on assessability. If we focus on assessability, we
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should reject the third ought-condition and, hence, (C.P1). Indeed, I hold that
there are genuine norms, even prescriptive norms, that are not action-guiding
(see Bridges, 2014; Ginsborg, 2012).10 Divine commandments, norms regarding
emotions, and laws are genuinely normative and prescriptive; but they don't
necessarily guide our performances. In fact, it seems that norms regarding what
emotions we should feel, e.g., cannot guide us in feeling these emotions. Anti-
normativists, however, think that calling a standard normative that cannot
guide anyone's compliance with it is merely to apply an idle label (Glüer and
Wikforss, 2009a, p. 60). To see that this is wrong, consider the following rule:
(R) In everything you do, always be guided and motivated by the fea-
tures of your act that make it right, except where they include (R),
in which case you should do it without being motivated or guided
by (R).
It is in principle impossible for rule (R) to guide and motivate acts that are
in accordance with (R). But that does nothing to show that (R) cannot be a
genuine norm. After all, it might be true that we ought to do the right thing
for the reasons that make it right unless that would involve some kind of rule-
fetishism. Rejecting the guidance-requirement does not make normativism an
empty claim. Rather, everyone should agree that, in general, not all genuine
norms are guiding someone's performances. Acknowledging this does not require
a novel construal of normativity (Glüer and Wikforss, 2013, p. 82). All it
requires is the realization that not all norms must, can, or are meant to be
applied in ﬁrst-personal deliberation. If acknowledging this basic fact about
norms means that I am accepting the conclusion of anti-normativism (Glüer
10Sellars already made a related point, when he wrote: The point I wish to make is the
obvious one that if a species of linguistic episode is not a doing in the practical sense, a per-
formance, then the relevant rules must be rules of criticism rather than rules of performance
(Sellars, 1967, p. 271). After all, norms of criticism don't necessarily guide the behavior of
the person who is performing the act that is the potential target of the criticism.
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andWikforss, 2013, p. 82), this suggests that the conclusion of anti-normativism
cannot be as interesting as it appears to be when formulated as neither meaning
nor content are normative.
However, let us again ignore this basic problem for the sake of charity. Is the
argument from guidance convincing once we grant, for the sake of argument,
that rule-following and guidance must play a crucial role in the constitution of
content or meaning?
Anti-normativists seem to think it's a problem that we cannot formulate
the relevant norms before we bring ourselves under them (Glüer and Wikforss,
2009a, p. 60). No one can have a pro-attitude towards bringing herself under
these norms before actually bringing herself under them. But why should this be
a problem? Perhaps the anti-normativist thinks that the relevant norms must
be of our own making and that we cannot make these norms unless we can think
and talk about them before making them. Firstly, however, it is not clear why
the normativist must hold that the relevant norms are of our own making. Of
course, the normativist must hold that what normally leads to someone being
able to think and talk meaningfully is, under normal circumstances, suﬃcient
to bring the subject under the relevant norms. That does not imply, however,
that we make the norms. Secondly, it is not clear why the norms cannot be of
our own making if we cannot think and talk about them before making them.
There is a sense in which thinking and talking are of our own making, but we
could not think and talk before we made thought and talk. So there must be
a sense in which we can make something without thinking or talking about it
before we make it. The normativist can hold that we make the norms that
underwrite normativism in this sense  whatever that turns out to be.
Perhaps the anti-normativist's real worry is that the norms that underwrite
normativism can, in principle, never guide anyone's states or acts  you cannot
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even intend to follow them (Glüer and Wikforss, 2009a, p. 60). There are two
quick responses available to the normativist. Firstly, it has been doubted, on en-
tirely independent grounds, that rule-following requires an intention to conform
to the rule.11 Secondly, the anti-normativist assumes that the normativist must
say that all intentional acts and states are cases of, or results of, rule-following.
The normativist can reject (C.P1), however, and hold that what matters is not
following the norms in every case but following them in suﬃciently many, or
in certain, cases.12 In fact, if the normativist thinks that the relevant norms
crucially include norms of reasoning (as I do), it is plausible that not all con-
tentful acts and states are the result of following these rules. After all, not all
contentful acts and states are the result of reasoning.13 That does not mean
that the contents of one's mental states cannot be (partially) determined by
norms one follows in one's reasoning.
In an attempt to rescue (C.P1), the anti-normativist might say that her
target is really the claim that all contentful acts and states are cases of, or results
of, rule-following. If that is right, anti-normativism is often misleadingly framed
as a claim about the normativity of meaning and content, and the normativist
is free to concede the point. However, the normativist need not do so. For if
we understand ArgumentC as an argument for the claim that there must be
contentful acts or states that are not cases of, or results of, rule-following, this
shifts all the weight to premise (C.P2). The anti-normativist must hold that
11Masahiro Yamada (2010, p. 296) writes it is not at all clear that rule-observing requires
any intention to conform to the rules. In fact, it is not even clear that a mental representation
of the rule is required  witness the enormous diﬃculties we typically have in spelling out
the ﬁner details of social norms even though we have no diﬃculties observing them.
12We can think this even if we focus on assessability and not guidance. For perhaps following
the rule in suﬃciently many cases can make it the case that acts of the relevant kind are
assessable by the norm.
13Anti-normativists formulate CD-normativism thus: The content of a subject S 's thoughts
is determined by the rules governing S 's reasoning (Glï¾÷er & Wikforss 2009a, p. 54). This
does not imply that all of S 's thoughts are the product of reasoning or the result of rule-
following, contrary to what Glï¾÷er and Wikforss implicate (Glüer and Wikforss, 2009a, p.
57).
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there is no interesting notion of rule-following on which rule-following does not
always require a prior contentful act or state (Glüer and Pagin, 1998; Glüer,
2002). I want to end this paper by suggesting that this is implausible.
Anti-normativists think that in order to follow a rule, your performance must
be the result of a practical inference in which the rule occurs in the content of
the premises. Let's begin with two reasons why the anti-normativist's picture
of rule-following is too restrictive: First, empirical psychology tells us that we
can, e.g., learn to follow the rules of an artiﬁcial grammar without having any
(explicit) inkling regarding their content. In such cases, we follow a rule with-
out the rule ﬁguring in our (explicit) practical reasoning (for an overview see
Pothos, 2007). Second, the anti-normativist's picture of rule-following makes it
impossible to follow, e.g., the rule of modus ponens. On the anti-normativist's
picture, following this rule must be the result of a practical inference like this
one: I want to follow modus ponens in my reasoning. Concluding that p would
be in accordance with modus ponens. So, I shall conclude that p. Now, if the
conclusion of this inference itself amounts to concluding that p, this conclusion
was not reached by modus ponens and the agent did not follow the rule of modus
ponens, after all. If, on the other hand, the conclusion of this inference does not
amount to concluding that p, then this concluding must be the result of another
inference. But then, by anti-normativist's lights, the concluding cannot be an
instance of following modus ponens. So, on the picture implicit in (C.P2), it is
impossible to follow the rule of modus ponens. But it is implausible that there
is no sense in which we can follow the rule of modus ponens. Thus, the picture
of rule-following at work in ArgumentC must be ﬂawed. The anti-normativist
might reply that her picture of rule-following is the only one that can distin-
guish (in a reasonable way) between genuine rule-following and merely acting
in accordance with a rule. There really isn't any alternative (Glüer and Pagin,
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1998; Glüer, 2002).
This is not the place to expound a theory of rule-following, but I think there
is an alternative. Following rule R is sometimes diﬀerent from merely acting
in accordance with rule R in virtue of the fact that the subject tries to get it
right, to do what is correct according to R, where this trying is not a matter of
having any prior or independent attitude towards R. Surely, the anti-normativist
will reply that you cannot try to do something without a representation of
what you are trying to do ﬁguring in your practical reasoning. But that must
be wrong. After all, in making a practical inference, one is trying to do so
correctly. Otherwise one wouldn't have failed by one's own lights when one
makes a mistake in reasoning practically. If this required another practical
inference, a vicious regress would ensue. Therefore, there must be a way of
trying to do something correctly, of trying to get it right, that does not require
that the act is the result of a practical inference. Indeed, your trying to reason
correctly just is your reasoning.
Anti-normativists might reply that even if reasoning can be a case of rule-
following without requiring any prior practical reasoning, it requires prior in-
tentional states. It's impossible that all such states are the result of reasoning.
The normativist can hold, however, that they are all cases of trying to get it
right. After all, when you judge, you are trying to judge truly. And this is so
although judging that p does not require you to ﬁrst form the judgment that
judging that p would be to judge truly. It might be diﬃcult to understand how
this is possible, but it seems plainly true that when you judge, you try to judge
truly and that does not imply that you ﬁrst formed the belief that judging as
you did is to judge truly.
The anti-normativist will object: trying to do something requires that one
acts intentionally. But you cannot act intentionally if you didn't already have
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contentful mental states. So how can trying to do something be constitutive of
having contentful mental states? I doubt that the fact that if I am reasoning,
I am trying to reason correctly, shows that reasoning is an intentional action.
But we can even grant this point if we wish. In the objection, all the work is
done by the already. If the fact that p requires that it was already the case
that q, it's implausible that q is constituted by p. The mere fact, however, that
if p, then q, does nothing to undermine such a claim. And, surely, we can act
intentionally without having any prior intention. Thus, we can say that when
you engage in reasoning and judging for the ﬁrst time, you also try to reason
and judge correctly for the ﬁrst time, and you have contentful mental states
for the ﬁrst time: all of this comes on the scene together. (Actually, I am not
sure that it really makes sense to speak about the ﬁrst piece of reasoning or
judgment you ever performed in your life; it seems more plausible that this is a
case where we should say: light dawns gradually over the whole.)
So the argument from guidance fails even if we ignore the basic problem
with the argument. It is not only unclear why the normativist should have any
special interest in guidance, but even if the normativist has such an interest,
the anti-normativist's conception of rule-following is implausibly restrictive.
6 Conclusion
I have argued that there is a basic problem with anti-normativists' consider-
ations: they overlook that normativists may focus on assessability by norms
and not on norm-compliance or guidance. Moreover, I have argued that even if
we ignore this basic problem, the arguments anti-normativist have put forward
still fail. So, assuming that the initial motivation for normativism is plausible,
normativists are in good standing. I have not tried to show that normativism
is true. What I have argued is that we have not been given good reasons to
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believe that normativism is false.
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